779 separatism; it is claimed, for example, that 72
668 Moslems have been deputies to Shanghai municipal and ch'ü congresses, and token participation tends to bring them into new orbits of activity.[57] Among the 29,000 Moslems in Shanghai, measures have allegedly been taken to provide for their special religious dietary needs,[58] and there are references to special food shipments for Ramadan. Such measures would tend to reduce [illegible] suspicion and resistance among the Moslems and, in the long run, to make integration easier. The Moslems of East China do not have the relative safety in numbers possessed by the large regional communities in the Southwest and the Northwest. The processes of Communization, secularization, and integration will probably advance rapidly in East China. The measures we have noted plus the activity of the Moslem cadre backed by the full force and apparatus of Communist government, will do more to reduce the age-old separatism and resistance of Islam than the measures of earlier Chinese governments.

V. CATHOLICISM

• 777 The older of the two Christian faiths in China has had 350 years of missionary and organizational experience. It is, in China as elsewhere, resourceful, flexible, and highly disciplined. In modern China, Catholicism has repeatedly come under nationalistic attack because

57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.

of its foreign support and its allegiance to Rome. The church has countered these attacks in a variety of ways: it has encouraged the Sinicization of Church symbols, e.g., the Virgin is portrayed as a Chinese woman in Chinese dress; it has given its foreign missionaries a more thorough grounding in Chinese language and culture, so that the best of them, wearing Chinese scholars' gowns as habits and speaking excellent Chinese, can make their way successfully in any stratum of Chinese society. The most striking response to nationalistic attacks has been the increasing use of Chinese priests throughout the hierarchy. This is part of world-wide policies in an age of rising nationalism. The following figures indicate the dimensions of the change since 1900:[59]

	Chinese Catholics	Foreign Priests	Native Priests
1900	700,000	1,375	471
1948	3,275,000	3,015	2,676

This process of replacing foreign clergy with Chinese clergy has made greatest progress in the older Catholic areas, particularly in North China. There are 144 dioceses or apostolic prefectures, and 29 of these, in the major cultural

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59. Jean Mosterlee, S.J., Les Martyrs de Chine parlent: L'Empire du Mao Tse-tung contre l'Eglise du Christ, Paris, 1953, p. 32; hereinafter cited as Monsterleet.

and commercial centers, are administered by Chinese prelates.[60] The elevation of a Chinese priest to the College of Cardinals in 1946 was a striking symbol of the Church's intention to advance the process of Sinicization.

Catholic cultural and educational activities have played an important role in the advance of the Church. Schools, colleges, and unversities have, on the one hand, made it possible for the youth of Chinese Catholic families to have a complete modern education under Church auspices and control; on the other, the colleges and universities have given the clergy a chance to win over non-Catholic youth enrolled as students. Catholic scientific and cultural research, such as that carried on at the famous Zikawei Observatory near Shanghai, make it clear that the Church and modern science are not in direct opposition to one another.

The situation in 1945-46 was encouraging to Chinese and foreign Catholics. The clergy was being rapidly Sinicized, charitable work was going forward. Catholic educational institutions were full. Native and foreign clergy had gained approval for their work in the war of resistance against Japan. At the same time there were developments which, especially in the light of later events, promised trouble to the Church. The exchange of envoys between the Vatican and the Nationalist Government took place in 1946; Bishop Paul Yu-pin was widely believed to have strong influence with Generalissimo Chiang; these and other signs of

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60. Ibid.

61. Cf. Raymonde de Jaegher and I. Corbally Kuhn, Tempête sur la Chine, Paris, 1953. [Next page.]

797 identification of the Church with the Nationalist Government boded ill for the Church when the government declined in power. As the Communist
798 power increased, the persecution of the Church begun in Communist areas in 1937, was a grim warning of what might be in store for Chinese Catholicism as a whole.[61] Catholic Action, the association of enthusiastic laymen for the advancement of the Faith, had been growing in all parts of the country from 1928 onward; there were two-hundred groups and thirty youth groups as early as 1930.[62] In 1948 the Papal Nuncio ordered the formation of the Legion of Mary, a more militant, zealous, and disciplined organization of Catholic laymen, which in many areas absorbed the Catholic Action groups. The new organization was set up by an American priest and it had the Chinese name of Sheng-mu chün, Army or Legion, of Mary. Many experienced Catholic missionaries were doubtful if any strong Chinese government would tolerate this type of militant organization. The group has proved of major propaganda value to the Communists and an object of their most ruthless measures of suppression.[63]

Communist policies and propaganda have made the most of all the vulnerabilities of the Chinese Catholic Church. Its foreign "imperialist" and Kuomintang connections were played up, and

62. Monsterleet, p. 148.

63. Cf. Hsü, Hsin Chung-kuo ti tsung-chiao ko-hsin yün-tung [The Movement for Religious Reformation in New China], Shanghai, 1951, pp. 9-13. Hereafter cited as Hsü.

798 Priests were "tried" and imprisoned and the Papal Nuncio was expelled from China. [67]

The next step in the campaign against Catholicism resembled the policy followed in Russia and in the East European satellites. This was the foundation by the Communists of a "national church" whose guiding spirits were a small minority of disaffected clergy and laymen. This group was constituted as the "Committee of the Reform Church." It was not subject to episcopal or pontifical directives. The group was to decide what was to be taught, who could say mass or give the sacraments; and it advocated "progressive," i.e., orthodox Communist teaching. Under its sponsorship certain "model parishes" were set up with "progressive" priests in charge. Apparently this organization has had only limited success. The Jesuit writer Jean Monsterleet estimates that only 2 per cent of the clergy went over to the "reformed church"; nearly all openly proclaimed their faith; some died as martyrs. [68]

From October 1952 on there was less persecution of Catholics, although between January 1951 and November 1953 the number of missionaries [69] was reduced through expulsion from 3,222 to 364.

• 799 By far the highest concentration of Catholic clergy in the East China Region has been in Shanghai. Shanghai, like Peking, had over 200 priests; the entire province [70] of Fukien had only 177. The following table indicates the distribution of Catholic centers in East China. [71]

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67. Ibid., p. 28 68. Monsterleet, p. 29.
It should be emphasized that these figures are given by a Catholic author. 69, 70, 71. [See next page

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Province	Metropolitan Bishopric	Suffragan Diocese	Number of Catholics, 1939
Shantung	Tsinan	Chou-ts'un	268,831
		Tzu-yang	
		Yentai (Chefoo)	
		Yang-ku	
		Lin-i	
		Ho-tse	
Anhwei	Anking	Pang-pu	113,828
		Wu-hu	
Kiangsu	Nanking	Hsü-chou	272,623
		Hai-men	
		Shanghai	
Chekiang	Hangchow	Ningpo	103,190
		Lin-hai (T'ai-chou)	
Fukien	Foochow	Hsia-p'u (Fu-ning)	86,730
		Amo	

798 Since Shanghai is both a major religious center and the principal center of Catholic education in East China. it may be useful to consider the impact of Communist policies on it. The

69. Mission Bulletin. April 1952, p. 323, and Jan. 1954, p. 56; cited in Walker, op. cit., p. 189.

70. Monsterleet, p. 33.

71. Monsterleet, pp. 16-17. The Catholic population figures are quoted from the Annuaire des Missions Catholiques de Chine 1939, Shanghai, 1939.

798 apostles; I saw the ambitious and selfish give up their goals and possessions; I saw some of my Christian youths break the bonds of family and friendship for this Cause." [77]

The basic question is whether the harassed and persecuted Church can find the means to give its own youth these qualities. If it cannot, its future throughout China will be dark indeed.

VI. PROTESTANTISM

797 In many respects the Protestant missionaries and their converts set the pattern for the modernizing movements which took place in Buddhis and Islam. Protestant religious work in the twentieth century came to be accompanied by widespread diverse, and large-scale social service, medical, and educational activities. The Protestant missionaries helped to awaken the social conscience of the Chinese, and the missions were major centers for the dissemination of general knowledge about the West. Sun Yat-sen was a devout Christian, and Christian thought left its mark on much of his work. As pioneers in medical education, in many fields of technical education, in women's education, and in many other spheres, the Protestants made striking contributions to the dissolution of the traditional order in China. But it was beyond their

77. Robert W. Greene, Calvary in China, New York, 1953, pp. 76-77.

powers to replace that order with a Christian democratic society. And they failed also to forge an effective instrument to work for that end: a disciplined, independent, vigorous body of Chinese Protestants.

Protestant missions began in the ports of the China coast that were gradually opened up after China's successive defeats by the Western powers. The rights of residence, travel, and property ownership for both Catholic and Protestant churches were exacted in the successive treaties which China was forced to sign. This background of, as it were, forced entry into China has handicapped Christianity in China in two important respects: as the tide of nationalistic sentiment rose, anti-Christian movements invariably accompanied anti-foreign and nationalistic manifestations. Secondly, the decades of foreign protection and foreign support prevented the Christian churches -- the Protestant perhaps more than the Catholic -- from developing their own means of self-support and their own mechanisms of survival in times of political upheaval.

Protestantism has suffered from its own sectarianism. A rational division of Christian effort was usually impossible when Baptists, Methodists, Episcopalians, and innumerable small sects were at odds with one another and brought diverse and conflicting interpretations of Christianity to the Chinese.[78]

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78. There were 66 different Protestant missionary societies in China in 1906. By 1919 there were 130 different societies, groups, and other missionary organizations. Cf. Pr. Damboriena,

[See next page.]

777 Naturally the antagonism between Catholic and Protestant mission workers -- their tendency to depreciate one another when dealing with the Chinese -- further weakened the whole effort. Martin Yang describes the antagonisms that developed in the Shantung countryside between Catholic and Protestant Chinese; this added to the tension that already existed between the mass of the villagers and the converts to both forms of Christianity.[79] Yang, himself a Christian, has this to say of the motivations of conversion in the village he studied: "The first converts were members of the Ch'en and Yang families and included a Ch'en scholar and his second brother. They were all ambitious men, and their primary purpose in conversion was to get positions as country preachers, and then to establish a church-subsidized village school, to use foreign influence through the church to deal with their opponents, and to sell food to the missionaries."[80] Chinese governments, imperial and

"Les missions Protestantes en China," Bulletin de l'Université l'Aurore. Ser. III, Vol. 8, No. 1, Shanghai, 1947, p. 18; hereinafter cited as Damoriena; Greighton Lacy, "The Missionary Exodus from China," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 4, Dec. 1955, observes: "Far more disruptive in almost every mission area has been the swarm of small, independent sects -- pentecostal, holiness, fundamentalist -- most of them divisive. Not only do they assert their unwillingness to co-operate with other Christian groups, but they seek most of their converts from the established churches."

79. Martin Yang, A Chinese Village, New York. 1945 pp. 158-64.

80. Ibid., p. 159.

797 nationalist, found the Christians troublesome, and, in the twenties and thirties, there were serious efforts to curb them. One of the effects of government sanctions, combined with the relatively poor results after ninety years of effort, was to reduce the enthusiasm for China missions among Christians abroad. This was reflected in the decreased flow of funds, notably from the United States. From nearly $6,000,000 in 1928, Protestant contributions fell to a little over $3,500,000 in 1933 and did not greatly exceed $4.000,000 in 1935 and 1936.[81] This handicapped nearly all fields of missionary endeavor.

Another arena in which the Protestants tried for influence was the great polemical struggle of the 1920's and 1930's over the nature and future of Chinese civilization. In this prolonged and important controversy, the Protestants found themselves handicapped by the divisions among themselves, notably that between modernists and fundamentalists, and also by the rising tide of nationalism. In the end the Protestants shared with idealistic Chinese and Western philosophers the failure to stem the rising tide of materialism in thought.

The Sino-Japanese War and the war in the Pacific disrupted missionary efforts in north and central China. At the war's end, the Protestant missionaries returned and set about the rehabilitation of church establishments. Apparently progress was made, but there were disquieting aspects.

81. Damboriena, p. 83.

797 The interdenominational unions which the Japanese had imposed during their occupation broke apart and sectarian rivalries sprang up again.

"The measure of self support achieved in wartime necessity collapsed before the inflowing torrent of foreign funds. Leadership which had demonstrated both courage and competence through years of crisis politely yielded to colleagues returning from the West."[82]

American financial support also drew upon the Protestants an increasing barrage of Communist and left-wing criticism as the Nationalist Government -- receiving American support -- became increasingly discredited. Protestants, because of their preponderant emphasis on the social gospel (serving God through service to society) and their less formidable unity and discipline, suffered less in Communist-occupied areas than did the Catholics. Yet the more clear-headed of the Protestants could not but dread the rise of Communist power.

798 The timetable of Communist moves against Protestants and their organizations follows approximately that for the Catholics noted above. The "national church," the "three autonomies," the

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82. Lacy, op. cit., p. 306.

confiscation of church property, church schools, and hospitals were accompanied by a steady expulsion of the missionaries. The following figures show the decrease in Protestant missionary personnel between 1935 and 1949 and the almost total elimination of missionaries since that time.[83] In 1935, there were 5,816 Protestant missionaries in China; in 1949, about 3,000; in April 1952, only 100.

It is not possible to document the proportion of Chinese Protestants who have made their peace with the Communist regime, but "modernism," the social gospel, sectarianism, and the lack of such punitive sanctions as excommunication all tend to make the Protestants less resistant to Communist force and persuasion than the Catholics. The "three autonomies" -- in support, government and propagation -- has been a stated goal of Chinese Protestantism since 1851 and the Chinese Protestant community has generally accepted this, when stated by the Communists, as a praiseworthy end.[84] A leading Chinese Protestant layman -- under what degree of pressure we do not know -- found a number of ways to come to terms with Communism: (1) as far back as the founding of Judaism, men's highest hope has been the establishment of a solidly united, ideal society; the Communists promise such a society; (2) sectarianism has created dissension, but the Chinese have a genius for compromise; therefore there is an opportunity to promote (under the Communist government) "a grand union of the churches"; (3) Christianity is a religion of world revolution, but it has been fettered and frustrated by feudal

83. The first figure is from Handbook of the Christian Movement, reproduced in Damboriena, p. 82. Other figures are from Walker. op. cit. p. 19.

84. Lacy, op. cit., pp. 307-08.

797 668 and reactionary institutions. The age of Marxism Leninism, therefore, is favorable to the realization of "Christian ideals."[85] Chinese Protestants are barraged by such statements, which even go so far as to assert that Jesus was a "patriotic anti-imperialist" in defending his country against the Romans.[86] How successfully Chinese Protestants are resisting this type of persuasion and the manifold pressures and blandishments of the Communist regime is unknown. Again, as in the case of the Catholics, loss of Protestant youth to the Communist "religion" would mean that the future in China will be dark indeed.

797 The East China Region has had the following distribution of Protestants. The first column gives the percentage of total population which was Protestant in 1938, the second, the gross number of Protestants in 1924.[87]

Province	1938 (per cent)	1924 (gross)
Shantung	12.2	41,821
Anhwei	1.5	5,070
Kiangsu	8.3	29,783
Chekiang	7.3	27,902
Fukien	11.3	38,584

85. Ts'ai Yung-ch'un, "Progressive Road for Christianity in the New China," Hsin Kuan-ch'a [New Observation], Vol. I, No. 8, Oct. 10, 1950; Current Background, 40, Dec. 15, 1950, p. 3.

86. Hsü, op. cit., p. 41.

87. Ku T'ing-ch'ang's percentage figures published in the Collectanea Commissionis Synodalis, XI, 1938, pp. 272, 281. Tables reproduced in Damboriena, pp. 90-91. These percentages are

797 The tendency for Protestantism to have its greatest stength in the accessible coastal provinces has persisted until today. In terms of social composition, the Protestant community has been estimated as 75 per cent rural and 25 per cent urban, with farmers prodominating followed by petty merchants and workers.[88]

Shanghai has long been a principal center for Christian religious and educational work, the headquarters for most missionary organizations. Although church property has been confiscated and missionaries expelled, there is evidence that Shanghai Protestant leaders have not suffered in the way that Catholic leaders have. They have apparently led their churches in a policy of accomodation to the new regime. An account by a Chinese Protestant -- and it is impossible to check its accuracy -- states that there are 140 Protestant churches in Shanghai holding services every Sunday, and we know from British evacuees that churches are well attended there.[89] The same Chinese Protestant describes the renovation or building of churches, nine in Hangchow, one at least in rural Kiangsu. He stresses particularly the assumption

[Continued from previous page.]

37. -- doubtful because, if correct, they would indicate a far larger number of Protestants than the Protestant Church has ever claimed. The 1924 figures are from China Yearbook, 1924.

88. Percentage estimates by the Dean of the University of Nanking as of the early 1930's. Damboriena, p. 30.

89. Wu Yao-tsung "Freedom of Religious Belief in Prosperous Strong Fatherland," Hong Kong, Wen Wei Pao, Oct. 1 1955; SCMP, 1159, October 28, 1955, p. 41; New York Times, Dec. 11, 1955. p. 32.

797 by Chinese Protestant sects of their own missionary functions -- one of the "three autonomies." He further states that nearly 200 students have been enrolled in divinity schools in both Nanking and Peking.[90]

The future of Protestantism is uncertain. The key to its survival is whether, within the strict limits imposed by the new Communist-Nationalist orthodoxy, a Christian church can win over a significant number of the youth. Christianity is continually castigated in education and in the press as backward, superstitious, and unscientific. The rewards of place and prestige go to those Chinese most fervent in their acceptance of the Communist orthodoxy. It is doubtful if a significant number of youth will act to cut themselves off from these rewards by embracing an alien religion.

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90. Wu, op. cit., p. 41.